"Faith, Reason & The University": Pope Benedict's Speech At The University of Regensburg

Wednesday, September 13, 2006

The Pope gave a remarkable speech at the University of Regensburg yesterday, where he used to be a professor. In it, he discusses the relationship between faith and reason, and as we've come to expect from his homilies, speeches and messages, this speech vivdly illsutrates how powerfully the professor resides in this Pope.

The speech touches on violence and Islam as the Pope moves into deeper discourse on unity of faith and reason. This, of course, is what the media will focus on, as this hysterical New York Times article by one Ian Fisher shows:

Pope Benedict, in inflamatory speech, assails all: secularism, Jihad, Islam and the Prophet Muhamad

Pope Benedict XVI weighed in Tuesday on the delicate issue of rapport between Islam and the West: He said that violence, embodied in the Muslim idea of jihad, or holy war, is contrary to reason and God’s plan, while the West was so beholden to reason that Islam could not understand it.

Did Mr. Fisher read the same speech I did? Or is his mind so saturated by politically correct blinders that he cannot recognized an clear, erudite discussion of faith and reason?

Zenit has what they term a "provisional" translation on their website. The Vatican website hasn't posted the English translation yet. If past patterns hold, that should happen tomorow.

Following is the Zenit translation:

Faith, Reason and the University
Memories and Reflections

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a moving experience for me to stand and give a lecture at this university podium once again. I think back to those years when, after a pleasant period at the Freisinger Hochschule, I began teaching at the University of Bonn. This was in 1959, in the days of the old university made up of ordinary professors. The various chairs had neither assistants nor secretaries, but in recompense there was much direct contact with students and in particular among the professors themselves. We would meet before and after lessons in the rooms of the teaching staff. There was a lively exchange with historians, philosophers, philologists and, naturally, between the two theological faculties.

Once a semester there was a "dies academicus," when professors from every faculty appeared before the students of the entire university, making possible a genuine experience of "universitas": The reality that despite our specializations which at times make it difficult to communicate with each other, we made up a whole, working in everything on the basis of a single rationality with its various aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of reason -- this reality became a lived experience.

The university was also very proud of its two theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the "whole" of the "universitas scientiarum," even if not everyone could share the faith which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: It had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God. That even in the face of such radical skepticism it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: This, within the university as a whole, was accepted without question.

I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by professor Theodore Khoury (Muenster) of part of the dialogue carried on -- perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara -- by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both.

It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned Persian. The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Koran, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the "three Laws": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Koran.

In this lecture I would like to discuss only one point -- itself rather marginal to the dialogue itself -- which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason," I found interesting and which can serve as the starting point for my reflections on this issue.

In the seventh conversation ("diálesis" -- controversy) edited by professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy war). The emperor must have known that sura 2:256 reads: "There is no compulsion in religion." It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under [threat]. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Koran, concerning holy war.

Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the "Book" and the "infidels," he turns to his interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship between religion and violence in general, in these words: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."

The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. "God is not pleased by blood, and not acting reasonably ("syn logo") is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats.... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...."

The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: Not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practice idolatry.

As far as understanding of God and thus the concrete practice of religion is concerned, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma which nowadays challenges us directly. Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true?

I believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: "In the beginning was the 'logos.'"

This is the very word used by the emperor: God acts with logos. Logos means both reason and word -- a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept of God, and in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith find their culmination and synthesis. In the beginning was the logos, and the logos is God, says the Evangelist. The encounter between the biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance.

The vision of St. Paul, who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: "Come over to Macedonia and help us!" (cf. Acts 16:6-10) -- this vision can be interpreted as a "distillation" of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between biblical faith and Greek inquiry.

In point of fact, this rapprochement had been going on for some time. The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many names and declares simply that he is, already presents a challenge to the notion of myth, to which Socrates' attempt to vanquish and transcend myth stands in close analogy. Within the Old Testament, the process which started at the burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, when the God of Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, was proclaimed as the God of heaven and earth and described in a simple formula which echoes the words uttered at the burning bush: "I am."

This new understanding of God is accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, which finds stark expression in the mockery of gods who are merely the work of human hands (cf. Psalm 115). Thus, despite the bitter conflict with those Hellenistic rulers who sought to accommodate it forcibly to the customs and idolatrous cult of the Greeks, biblical faith, in the Hellenistic period, encountered the best of Greek thought at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident especially in the later wisdom literature.

Today we know that the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced at Alexandria -- the Septuagint -- is more than a simple (and in that sense perhaps less than satisfactory) translation of the Hebrew text: It is an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in the history of Revelation, one which brought about this encounter in a way that was decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity. A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act "with logos" is contrary to God's nature.

In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which ultimately led to the claim that we can only know God's "voluntas ordinata." Beyond this is the realm of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done.

This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazn and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God's transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions.

As opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language (cf. Lateran IV).

God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love "transcends" knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Ephesians 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is logos. Consequently, Christian worship is "logic latreía" -- worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Romans 12:1).

This inner rapprochement between biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of religions, but also from that of world history -- it is an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other way around: This convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage, created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.

The thesis that the critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith has been countered by the call for a de-Hellenization of Christianity -- a call which has more and more dominated theological discussions since the beginning of the modern age. Viewed more closely, three stages can be observed in the program of de-Hellenization: Although interconnected, they are clearly distinct from one another in their motivations and objectives.

De-Hellenization first emerges in connection with the fundamental postulates of the Reformation in the 16th century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one element of an overarching philosophical system.

The principle of "sola scriptura," on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this program forward with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.

The liberal theology of the 19th and 20th centuries ushered in a second stage in the process of de-Hellenization, with Adolf von Harnack as its outstanding representative. When I was a student, and in the early years of my teaching, this program was highly influential in Catholic theology too. It took as its point of departure Pascal's distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

In my inaugural lecture at Bonn in 1959, I tried to address the issue. I will not repeat here what I said on that occasion, but I would like to describe at least briefly what was new about this second stage of de-Hellenization. Harnack's central idea was to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message, underneath the accretions of theology and indeed of Hellenization: This simple message was seen as the culmination of the religious development of humanity. Jesus was said to have put an end to worship in favor of morality. In the end he was presented as the father of a humanitarian moral message.

The fundamental goal was to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in Christ's divinity and the triune God. In this sense, historical-critical exegesis of the New Testament restored to theology its place within the university: Theology, for Harnack, is something essentially historical and therefore strictly scientific. What it is able to say critically about Jesus is, so to speak, an expression of practical reason and consequently it can take its rightful place within the university.

Behind this thinking lies the modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in Kant's "Critiques," but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the natural sciences. This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology.

On the one hand it presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently: This basic premise is, so to speak, the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature. On the other hand, there is nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield ultimate certainty. The weight between the two poles can, depending on the circumstances, shift from one side to the other. As strongly positivistic a thinker as J. Monod has declared himself a convinced Platonist/Cartesian.

This gives rise to two principles which are crucial for the issue we have raised. First, only the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. Anything that would claim to be science must be measured against this criterion. Hence the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity.

A second point, which is important for our reflections, is that by its very nature this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.

We shall return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: It is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by "science" and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective.

The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.

Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has been leading, I must briefly refer to the third stage of de-Hellenization, which is now in progress. In the light of our experience with cultural pluralism, it is often said nowadays that the synthesis with Hellenism achieved in the early Church was a preliminary inculturation which ought not to be binding on other cultures.

The latter are said to have the right to return to the simple message of the New Testament prior to that inculturation, in order to inculturate it anew in their own particular milieux. This thesis is not only false; it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which had already come to maturity as the Old Testament developed.

True, there are elements in the evolution of the early Church which do not have to be integrated into all cultures. Nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.

And so I come to my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: We are all grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which reflects one of the basic tenets of Christianity.

The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them.

We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.

Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world's profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions.

A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology. Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based.

Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought -- to philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding.

Here I am reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so Socrates says: "It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being -- but in this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss."

The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur -- this is the program with which a theology grounded in biblical faith enters into the debates of our time.

"Not to act reasonably (with logos) is contrary to the nature of God," said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.

2006 Petroleum Essay Contest

Future Scientists and Engineers of America (FSEA)

Sponsored by Los Angeles Basin Section, Society of Petroleum Engineers

First Place – 4th and 5th Grade

                                    Oil and Gas in California

By Bradley Ries

The United States is the world’s third largest producer of oil. The United States is also

the largest consumer of oil. The United States imports about two-thirds from other

countries. New technology and conservation could help the United States be less

dependent on other countries for oil. In the United States the top producing states are

Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, California, Oklahoma and Arizona.

California depends on oil and natural gas for most of its energy needs. California and

other states need oil to make nylon, plastic, fertilizers, asphalt, gasoline, and the

electricity in our houses.

Oil comes from tiny grains of sand, silt and clay that are moved by wind and water, until

they settle in low spots, normally underwater. These small rocks cover dead diatoms and

other dead plants and fish. Then the small rocks get covered by more diatoms and other

dead plants and fish. This cycle keeps repeating over and over. The small rocks are

squashed from the pressure and are buried deeper and deeper. The dead plants and fish

decay and form oil and natural gas. Exactly how it is formed isn’t known. What is

known is that heat, pressure and bacteria are all important.

Geologists are hired to find the oil reservoirs, and get permission to drill from

governmental agencies. Exploratory wells are set up in groups where the geologist thinks

there is oil. Only one in seven exploratory well will be a good one. A drilling rig will be

centered on the place where the oil well will be. Oil is piped from the well to a holding

tank. The oil is then taken by truck to a refinery.

It is at the refinery that the oil is made into different products for us to use such as diesel

fuel, jet fuel, grease, solvent and gasoline. It can be refined more into rubber, medicine,

paint, nylon and plastic.

By writing this paper I use that I use a lot of oil. I use plastic for milk jugs, cups and my

Playstation 2 is made out of plastic! My soccer, basketball and baseball uniforms are all

made out of nylon material. My Dad’s trucking business uses diesel fuel, grease, solvent,

asphalt and rubber every day.

We are very dependent on our use of oil, but it won’t last forever. Oil is a nonrenewable

resource. We have to find new oil and gas fields. We also must conserve our resources.

My Papa is thinking of a way to conserve gasoline and money, he is looking into buying

a hybrid car. I will try to conserve oil and natural gas because I now realize how important it is.

第一课 春 天　　

春风吹，天气暖 冰雪融化 种子发芽 果树开花 我们来到小河边，来到田野里，来到山冈上。我们找到了春天。
第一课啊，从此以后我们就陷入了各种课本的汪洋大海之中啊

第二课 桃花 苹果花 海棠花 　　　　
　　　　　　 我们村里种了许多果树。现在是春天，满树都是花，我们村是花园。到了秋天，树上结满果子，我们村就成了果园。

第三课　　
　　　　　　 耕地 播种 施肥 浇水
　　　　　　 春天，人们在地里辛勤劳动。　
　　
第四课
　　　　　　蓝天 降落伞
　　　　　　姐姐的胆子真大，
　　　　　　敢从天上跳下 ！
　　　　　　蓝天上花儿朵朵，
　　　　　　也不知道哪朵是姐姐的花 。

第五课
　　　　　　蝴蝶 蜻蜓 蜈蚣 金鱼 燕子 老鹰
　　　　　　竹做的骨头纸做的背，
　　　　　　春风送它们往天上飞。
　　　　　　我们在地上边笑边跑，
　　　　　　它们在天上越飞越高。
　　
第六课　　　
　　　　　　泉水 小溪 江 河 湖 海
　　　　　　泉水泉水你到哪里去？
　　　　　　我要流进小溪里。
　　　　　　溪水溪水你到哪里去？
　　　　　　我要流进江河里。
　　　　　　江水河水你们要到哪里去？
　　　　　　我们都要流进海洋里。

第七课
　　　　　　海南岛 鲜花盛开 长江 柳枝发芽 大兴安岭 雪花飘舞
　　　　　　大兴安岭，雪花还在飘舞，
　　　　　　长江两岸，柳树开始发芽，
　　　　　　海南岛上，鲜花已经盛开。
　　　　　　我们的祖国多么广大。

第八课　　　
　　　　　　 烈士墓 纪念碑 花圈
　　　　　　 清明节到了，我们去扫墓。
　　　　　　 我们排着队，来到纪念碑前，献上亲手做的花圈。
　　

　　阅读练习
　　　　　
　　　 滴答，滴答，
　　　　　　 下雨啦，下雨啦
　　　　　　 麦苗说：
　　　　　　 “ 下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　 我要长大。”　
　　　　　　 桃树说：
　　　　 　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　 我要开花。”
　　　　　　 葵花子说：
　　　　　　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　 我要发芽。”
　　　　　　 小弟弟说：
　　　　　　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　 我要种瓜。”
　　　　　　 滴答，滴答，
　　　　　　 下雨啦，下雨啦。

第九课　 乌 鸦 喝 水
　　　　　　一只乌鸦口渴了，到处找水喝。乌鸦看见一个瓶子，瓶子里有水。可是瓶子很高 ，瓶口又小，里边的水不多，它喝不着。怎么办呢？乌鸦看见旁边有许多小石子 。它想出办法来了。 乌鸦把小石子一个一个地衔来，放到瓶子里，瓶子里的水渐渐升高了，乌鸦就喝着水了。

第十课小 猴 子 下 山
　　　　　　 有一天，一只小猴子下山来。
　　　　　　 它走到一块玉米地里，看见玉米结得又大又多，非常高兴，就掰了一个，扛着往前走。小猴子扛着玉米，走到一棵桃树下。它看见满树的桃子又大又红，非常高兴，就扔了玉米去摘桃子。小
　　猴子捧着几个桃子，走到一片瓜地里。它看见满地的西瓜又大又圆，非常高兴，就扔了桃子去摘西瓜。小猴子抱着一个大西瓜往回走。走着走着，看见一只小兔蹦蹦跳跳的，真可爱。它非常高兴，就扔了西瓜去追小兔.小兔跑进树林子，不见了。小猴子只好空着手回家去。

第十一课 司 马 光
　　　　　　 古时候有个人叫司马光。他小时候，有一回跟几个小朋友在花园里玩。有个小朋友不小心，掉到大水缸里了。别的小朋友都慌了，叫着喊着，有的跑去找大人。司马光没有慌。他举起一块石头，使劲砸那口缸，几下子就砸破了。 缸里的水流出来了，掉在缸里的小朋友得救了。

第十二课 一 只 小 羊 羔
　　　　 放学了，巴特在回家的路上，听见咩咩的叫声。他东找西找，在一条小沟里找到一只小羊羔。是谁丢了羊羔呢？巴特抱着小羊羔，到处去打听。人家都说没有丢。天黑了，巴特只好把小羊羔抱回家去。第二天，巴特一早起来，就去看小羊羔，还给它奶喝。巴特放学回来，妈妈说，小羊羔是五队丢的。巴特顾不上吃饭，抱起小羊羔，飞快地向五队跑去。小羊羔又回到了羊妈妈的身边。

第十三课　　春 风 吹
　　　　　　　　　　春风吹，
　　　　　　　　　　春风吹，
　　　　　　　　　　吹绿了柳树，
　　　　　　　　　　吹红了桃花，
　　　　　　　　　　吹来了燕子，
　　　　　　　　　　吹醒了青蛙。
　　　　　　　　　　春风吹，
　　　　　　　　　　春风吹，
　　　　　　　　　　春风微微地吹，
　　　　　　　　　　小雨轻轻地下。
　　　　　　　　　　大家快来种蓖麻，
　　　　　　　　　　大家快来种葵花。

第十四课 小 河 流 过 我 门 前
　　　　　　　　　　小河流过我门前，
　　　　　　　　　　我留小河玩一玩。
　　　　　　　　　　小河摇头不答应，
　　　　　　　　　　急急忙忙去浇田。
　　
　　　　　　　　　　小河流过我门前，
　　　　　　　　　　我请小河站一站。
　　　　　　　　　　小河摇头不答应，
　　　　　　　　　　急急忙忙去发电。
　　
　　　　　　　　　　小河不肯玩一玩，
　　　　　　　　　　小河不肯站一站，
　　　　　　　　　　一分一秒也不停，
　　　　　　　　　　日日夜夜奔向前。
　　
　第十五课 燕子飞回来了
　　　　春天到了，小燕子跟着妈妈从很远很远的南方飞回来。
　　　　飞呀，飞呀，她们飞过大海。小燕子往下一看，奇怪地问：“妈妈，海面上哪儿来那么多铁塔？”妈妈笑着说：“ 孩子，那是井架，工人在开采海底的石油呢。”
　　　　飞呀，飞呀，她们飞过高山。小燕子往下一看，奇怪地问：“妈妈，那火车为什么不冒烟呢？”妈妈笑着说：“ 孩子，那是电力机车。你看，车顶上还有电线呢。”
　　　　飞呀，飞呀，她们飞过田野，飞到去年住过的地方。小燕子奇怪地问：“妈妈，这里哪儿来那么多新房子？”妈妈笑着说：“孩子，农民过上好日子啦。你看，那写字的孩子不是秋成吗？”
　　　　小燕子高兴地说：“妈妈，秋成也上学了。”妈妈说：“是呀！农村的变化可真大啊！”

第十六课 谜 语
　　　　　　　　　　　　有时落在山腰，
　　　　　　　　　　　　有时挂在树梢，
　　　　　　　　　　　　有时象个圆盘，
　　　　　　　　　　　　有时象把镰刀。
　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　 云儿见它让路，
　　　　　　　　　　　　小树见它招手，
　　　　　　　　　　　　禾苗见它弯腰，
　　　　　　　　　　　　花儿见它点头。
　　
　　
　　　　　　　　　　　 阅读练习
　　　　春姑娘轻轻地飞来了。她飞过高山，来到江河，飞过森林，来到田野，把春风春雨送到人间。大地披上了绿色的新装，花草树木快乐地挥着小手。一群群小鸟跟着春姑娘，向四面八方报信：春姑娘来啦！春姑娘来啦！
　　
　　
　　　　　　　　　　　对话练习
　　学生：老师，我可以进来吗？老师：进来吧。你有什么事？学生：语文作业本都收齐了，交给您。老师：好，放在这里吧。谢谢你。学生：不用谢。老师，值日做完了，您还去看看吗？老师：好，咱们一起去吧！
　　
　　
　　解放军：小朋友，请问到和平路十二楼怎么走？小学生：您要去的地方离我家不远，请您跟我一起走吧！解放军：谢谢，这太巧了。小学生：这儿是我家。您再往前走，马路对面第二座楼就是。解放军：小朋友，谢谢你了。小学生：不用谢，再见！解放军：再见！

第十七课 这个办法真好
　　　　毛主席七岁的时候，有一回，和小伙伴们到山上去放牛。怎样又能放好牛，又能多砍些柴，还能捡些野果子呢？他和大家想出了一个好办法。他们分成三个组，一组放牛，一组砍柴，一组捡野果子。
　　　　天快黑了，放牛组把牛喂得饱饱的，砍柴组砍到许多柴，捡果子组捡了满筐的野果 。他们把柴和果子分成几份，每人一份。大家高兴地说：“ 这个办法真好。”
　　 毛主席把自己的一份让给了最穷的伙伴。
　　

第十八课 送 雨 衣
　　　　夜很深了，周总理还在灯下紧张地工作。突然一阵雷声，下起大雨来了。
　　　　不一会儿，邓妈妈一手打着雨伞，一手拿着雨衣，来到小郭站岗的地方。她对小郭说 ：“总理让我给你送雨衣来了，快披上吧。”
　　　　邓妈妈帮小郭披上了雨衣，又说：“总理让我告诉你，打雷下雨的时候，不要站在大树下。”小郭听了，激动得说不出话来。

第十九课 她 是 谁
　　　　王小童上学去。
　　　　有位老奶奶在他前边走。刚下过雨，路很滑，老奶奶摔倒了。
　　　　小童赶快跑过去，把老奶奶扶起来，送她过马路。
　　　　这时候，一个过路的人问小童：“她是你的奶奶吗？”
　　　　小童说：“不是。”
　　　　“是你的姥姥吗？”
　　　　“也不是。”
　　　　“她是谁？”
　　　　“我不认识她。”

第二十课 我选我
　　　　李永勤是我们班上的劳动委员，前几天他转学了。
　　　　今天的班会上，林老师让大家补选一个劳动委员。选谁呢？教室里静悄悄的，大家都在想。突然王宁站起来说：“我选我。”大家都愣住了。
　　　　林老师亲切地说：“王宁，说说吧，你为什么选自己？”王宁说：“我和李永勤是好朋友。他爱劳动，爱集体。我要象他那样热爱劳动，关心集体。”
　　　　王宁的话刚说完，教室里响起了一片掌声。
　　

第二十一课 丁 丁 和 小 飞 机
　　丁丁是个聪明的孩子，一心想开飞机。
　　老师在教生字，丁丁一边听，一边忙着做小飞机。
　　老师看见了，问：“丁丁你在做什么？”丁丁站起来，低声说：“我在做飞机。”
　　老师说：“上课的时候，好好学习，长大了才能开飞机。”
　　晚上 ，丁丁做了个梦。梦见纸飞机变成了银光闪闪的真飞机。丁丁连忙跑过去。
　　忽然飞机唱起歌来：
　　　　　　　　　　丁丁真聪明，
　　　　　　　　　　会做纸飞机。
　　　　　　　　　　丁丁你快来，
　　　　　　　　　　来开真飞机。
　　丁丁高兴极了。他上了飞机，摸摸这儿，摸摸那儿，想开飞机。
　　忽然飞机又唱起歌来：
　　　　　　　　　　丁丁没文化，
　　　　　　　　　　不会开飞机。
　　　　　　　　　　飞机开不动，
　　　　　　　　　　丁丁真着急。
　　　　一着急，丁丁醒了。
　　　　同学们，请你们想一想，丁丁长大了会开飞机吗？ 　　
　　
第二十二课 大象 和 起重机
　　　　　　　　　　　　大象 木材 起重机 钢材
　　　　大象能卷起一根木材。大象的力气真大。
　　　　起重机能吊起好多根钢材。起重机的力气更大。
　　
第二十三课　　　 虹
　　　　　　　　　　　夏天 傍晚 虹
　　　　　　　　　　　一阵雷雨停了，
　　　　　　　　　　　太阳出来了。
　　　　　　　　　　　一条虹挂在天空，
　　　　　　　　　　　象一座七色的桥。
　　　　　　　　　　　太阳慢慢地下去了，

　　虹不见了。

第二十四课 蔬　　 菜
　　 萝卜 茄子 扁豆 竹笋 白菜 菠菜 西红柿 黄花菜
　　　　蔬菜的种类很多，有的吃根，有的吃茎，有的吃叶子，有的吃花，还有的吃果实。

第二十五课 庄稼的好朋友
　　　　　　　　青蛙 猫头鹰 七星瓢虫 赤眼蜂
　　　　青蛙捉害虫。猫头鹰捉田鼠。青蛙和猫头鹰是庄稼的好朋友。
　　　　七星瓢虫爱吃蚜虫。赤眼蜂能消灭螟虫。七星瓢虫和赤眼蜂也是庄稼的好朋友。

第二十六课 怎样学习
　　　　　　　认真听讲 专心读书 按时完成作业
　　　　 我们要努力学习，从小养成爱学习的习惯。

第二十七课　　讲卫生
　　　　　　刷牙 理发 剪指甲 洗澡 换衣服 晒被子
　　　　　　　　　　天天睡前要刷牙，
　　　　　　　　　　常剪指甲常理发，
　　　　　　　　　　勤换衣服勤洗澡，
　　　　　　　　　　讲究卫生身体好。

第二十八课 小 八 路
　　　　他是谁？
　　　　你看他身穿军装，头戴军帽，脚穿草鞋，胳膊上还有臂章。原来他是个小八路。
　　　　你看他长得多结实啊！他一定跟着毛主席跑过很多路，打过很多仗。他准是个勇敢的小八路。
　　　　你看他一有空就坐在石头上，掏出小本子写字，多么专心啊！他真是个爱学习的小八路。
　　　　小八路是我们学习的好榜样。

第二十九课 王 二 小
　　　　王二小是儿童团员。他常常一边放牛，一边给八路军放哨。
　　　　有一天，敌人来 “扫荡”，走到山口迷了路。敌人看见王二小在山坡上放牛，就叫他带路。
　　　　王二小装着听话的样子走在前面，把敌人带进了八路军的埋伏圈。
　　　　突然，四面八方响起了枪声。敌人知道上了当，就杀害了小英雄王二小。
　　　　正在这时候，八路军从山上冲下来，消灭了全部敌人。
　　
　第三十课 明 明 上 学
　　　　早上，明明去上学。他走着走着，忽然听见蛐蛐的叫声。明明一听，就知道草丛里有一只好蛐蛐。
　　　　明明轻轻地走过去，扒开草一看，好大的一只蛐蛐。他用手一捂，没捂着。蛐蛐一跳，又钻进草丛里去了。明明追上去，扒开草仔细地找，扒来扒去，怎么也找不着。
　　　　这时候，小文在路上喊：“明明，还不快走，要迟到啦！”明明立刻从草丛里走出来 ，拍了拍身上的土，和小文一同往学校去。
　　　　他们刚走进教室，上课铃就响了。
　　　　明明看了看小文，笑了。

第三十一课 小 白 兔 和 小 灰 兔
　　　　老山羊在地里收白菜，小白兔和小灰兔来帮忙。
　　　　收完白菜，老山羊把自己种的白菜送给他们。
　　　　小灰兔收下白菜，说：“谢谢您！”
　　　　小白兔不要白菜，说：“您送我一些菜子吧。”
　　　　老山羊送给小白兔一包菜子。
　　　　小白兔回到家里，把地翻松了，种上菜子。
　　　　过了几天，白菜长出来了。
　　　　小白兔常常给白菜浇水，施肥，拔草，捉虫。
　　　　白菜很快地长大了。
　　　　小灰兔把老山羊送的白菜拿回家里。
　　　　他天天不干活，饿了就吃老山羊送的白菜。
　　　　过了些日子，白菜就吃完了。
　　　　小灰兔没吃的了，又到老山羊家里去要白菜。
　　　　他看见小白兔挑着一担白菜，给老山羊送来。
　　　　小灰兔很奇怪，问道：“小白兔，你的菜是哪儿来的？”
　　　　小白兔说：“自己种的。只有自己种，才有吃不完的菜。”
　　
第三十二课 画
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　远看山有色，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　近听水无声，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　春去花还在，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　人来鸟不惊。

第三十二课 啄　　木　　鸟
　　　　一棵老树生了病，有些叶子黄了。
　　　　一个医生飞来，落在树上。他用嘴这里敲敲，那里敲敲，找到了生虫子的地方，就啄
　　一个洞。他伸进长舌头，把虫子一个一个地钩出来吃。吃完虫子，张开翅膀飞走了。
　　　　老树的病让医生治好了，慢慢地长出新叶子来。
　　这个医生就是啄木鸟。

第三十三课 要 下 雨 了
　　　　小白兔弯着腰在山坡上割草。天气很闷，小白兔直起身子，伸伸腰。
　　一只小燕子从他头上飞过。小白兔大声喊：“燕子，燕子，你为什么飞得这么低啊？”
　　燕子边飞边说：“要下雨了。空气很潮湿，虫子的翅膀沾了小水珠，飞不高。我正忙
　　着捉虫子呢！”
　　　　是要下雨了吗？ 小白兔往前一看，那边池子里的小鱼都游到水面上来了。
　　　　小白兔跑过去问：“小鱼，小鱼，今天怎么有空出来啊？”
　　　　小鱼说：“要下雨了。水里闷得很，我们游到水面上透透气。小白兔，你快回家吧，
　　小心淋着雨。”
　　　　小白兔连忙挎起篮子往家跑。他看见路边有一大群蚂蚁。小白兔把要下雨的消息告诉
　　蚂蚁。一只大蚂蚁说：“是要下雨了，我们正忙着往高处搬家呢！”
　　　　小白兔加快步子往家跑。他一边跑一边喊：“妈妈，妈妈，要下雨了！”
　　　　哗，哗，哗，大雨下起来了！

第三十五课 大 熊 猫
　　　　动物园里有许多珍贵的动物，最吸引人的要数大熊猫了。
　　　大熊猫身子胖，尾巴短，毛很光滑。四肢和肩膀是黑的，身子和头是白的。最逗人的
　　是一双圆圆的黑眼圈，一对毛茸茸的黑耳朵。
　　　　大熊猫小的时候很活泼，喜欢爬上爬下。长大以后，不大爱活动，常常用爪抱着头，
　　呼呼大睡。它睡觉的时候，你去逗它，它睁开眼睛看看你，又呼呼地睡了。它睡醒了，就
　　摆动着胖胖的身体，走来走去找东西吃。
　　　　大熊猫最爱吃新鲜的竹叶、 竹笋。你看它抓住一大把竹叶，吃得多香啊！
　　

后面一课 如果记不起来的，那真是找抽了。
　　
　　
　　　 　 第三十六课 锄　禾
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　锄禾日当午，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　汗滴禾下土。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　谁知盘中餐，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　粒粒皆辛苦。

第三十七课 两 个 孩 子
　　　　一天，朱总司令带了警卫员，骑着马，经过一座山。忽然，听见山上传来一阵阵孩子
　　哭的声音。他们立刻跳下马，顺着哭声走去。
　　　　哭声是从一个山洞里传出来的。朱总司令在洞口大声喊：“孩子，别哭了，快出来吧
　　！伯伯这里有好东西吃！”哭声停下来了，从洞里走出来两个孩子，一个六七岁，一个三
　　四岁。他们穿着破衣服，冻得直发抖。朱总司令和警卫员把孩子紧紧地搂在怀里，拿出地
　　瓜、栗子、山梨给他们吃。
　　　　那个大孩子望着朱总司令的军帽，伸手摸了摸红五星，说：“你们是红军吧？我妈妈
　　被敌人打死了。她临死的时候说，红军会来救我们的！”朱总司令听了，把孩子搂得更紧
　　了。

第三十八课 列 宁 小 时 候
　　　　列宁小时候是一个认真学习的孩子。
　　　　列宁在学校里，每门功课都学得很好。老师讲课，他用心听。老师留的作业，他认真
　　做。
　　列宁做完学校里的功课，还读许多课外书。他常常把书里的故事讲给别人听。他爱书
　　里那些勤劳勇敢的人，拿他们做自己的榜样。
　　　　列宁十分爱护书。他从来不把书弄脏，也不把书到处乱扔。
　　　　列宁小时候就是这样学习的。

第三十九课 学画
　　　　古时候有一个人叫王冕。他小的时候死了父亲。因为家里穷，王冕只念了三年书，就
　　去给人家放牛。他一边放牛。一边找些书来读。
　　　　一个夏天的傍晚，王冕在湖边放牛。忽然乌云密布，下了一阵大雨。大雨过后，一片
　　阳光照得满湖通红。湖里有十来枝荷花，花瓣上清水滴滴，荷叶上水珠滚来滚去。王冕看
　　得出神，心里想，要是能把它画下来，那多好啊！
　　　　王冕用平时节省下来的钱买了画笔、 颜料，又找来些纸，学画荷花。他开始画不象
　　，可是不灰心，天天画。画了几个月，那纸上的荷花就象刚从湖里采来的一样。
　　

第四十课 明天还有明天的事
　　　　暑假里的一天下午，燕燕、杨力和小勇在屋子里做作业。
　　窗户开着。湖边柳树上的知了叫得多么热闹。杨力往窗外一看，有几个小朋友正在湖
　　里游泳。他坐不住了，说：“多热啊！湖水不深，咱们也去游泳吧。”燕燕说：“等一会
　　儿，还没做完作业呢。”
　　　　过了一会儿，杨力又说：“真热，怎么这么热啊！咱们到柳树底下去凉快一会儿再做
　　吧！”小勇说：“是啊，真热。”燕燕抬起头来看了看他们，说：“不， 咱们还是安下
　　心来，把作业做完再去。”杨力说：“今天的作业做不完，明天做不行吗？”燕燕说：“
　　明天还有明天的事。”大家都不说话了，低着头做作业。
　　　　又过了一会儿，作业都做完了。杨力一边收拾书本，一边说：“现在可以去游泳了吧
　　。”燕燕说：“你们以为我不喜欢游泳吗？我比你们还喜欢呢。走，咱们一块儿去！”
　　
阅读练习
　　　　　　　
　　　　　 滴答，滴答，
　　　　　　　　 下雨啦，下雨啦
　　　　　　　　 麦苗说：
　　　　　　　　 “ 下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　　　 我要长大。”　
　　　　　　　　 桃树说：
　　　　　　 　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　　　 我要开花。”
　　　　　　　　 葵花子说：
　　　　　　　　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　　　 我要发芽。”
　　　　　　　　 小弟弟说：
　　　　　　　　 “下吧，下吧，
　　　　　　　　 我要种瓜。”
　　　　　　　　 滴答，滴答，
　　　　　　　　 下雨啦，下雨啦。
　　
　　
　　 小鸟说：早早早
　　　　接：
　　　　你为什么背上小书包
　　　　我去上学校
　　　　天天不迟到
　　　　爱学习
　　　　爱....
　　　　长大要为人民立功劳